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on WEU in the process of European Union 
- reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
( i) Recalling that the Assembly of WEU, as part of the organisation of Western European Union under 
the terms of the agreement on the status of WEU signed in Paris on 11th May 1955, is an integral part of 
the development of the European Union as provided in Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European 
Union; 
( ii) Underlining that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty obliges the Council to keep the Assem-
bly better informed than hitherto about developments in the CFSP and other sectors of the Union in all 
matters which come within the competence of WEU in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(iii) Disapproving the Council's delay in transmitting Annex N, on the links between the Union and 
WEU, to Chapter N of the document on the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty; 
(iv) Deploring also the poor information contained in the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the 
Assembly on the new working relations between WEU and the Union; 
(v) Considering that the wording of Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union gives 
reason for doubts about the sharing of responsibilities between WEU and the Union; 
(vi) Considering also that the hitherto agreed "practical arrangements" contained in Annex Non the 
links between the Union and WEU restrict the areas of action for WEU in a way which is not compatible 
with WEU's f~-reaching obligations stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(vii) Deploring in fact that these arrangements and the lack of political will are some of the many factors 
which contributed to WEU's marginalised role in international crisis-management particularly regarding 
the conflicts in former Yugoslavia; 
(viii) Underlining the important role WEU has to fulfil on behalf of the Union in maintaining transatlan-
tic solidarity and co-operation in security and defence matters; 
(ix) Welcoming the successful outcome of the negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
regarding their accession to the European Union; 
(x) Welcoming also the firm commitment of all the acceding states to include in their accession, in full 
and without reservation, the provision of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the establishment of a 
common foreign and security policy; 
(xi) Expressing the hope that the referenda to be held in Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden will be 
positive; 
(xii) Recalling the important contribution and experience of the four EFTA countries in peace-keeping 
operations within the United Nations; 
( xiii) Convinced that defining a common European defence policy should now commence even though 
all members of the European Union are not yet full members of WEU; 
(xiv) Noting that the countries called upon to accede to the European Union have not applied for mem-
bership of WEU with the exception of Norway which seeks full membership of WEU once it becomes a 
member of the European Union; 
(xv) Recalling that the NATO summit meeting on lOth January 1994 did not agree to the accession to 
the North Atlantic Treaty of any of the member countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation; 
(xvi) Repeating therefore paragraphs 1 and 2 of Recommendation 556, to grant simultaneously to all 
the member countries of the Forum of Consultation an associate status in WEU; 
(xvii) Earnestly desiring the progressive integration of all the states of Western and Central Europe in a 
system of co-operation ensuring security, stability and peace for Europe as a whole; 
(xviii) Hoping that the necessary conditions can be created for other countries, such as Slovenia and 
Moldova, to acquire the new associate status in the future, on the basis of the same historical, geograph-




( xix) Considering that the devolution of the exercise of matters within the competence of WEU to other 
international institutions or to countries which are not members of WEU or NATO might paralyse any 
steps towards joint action on defence and security in Europe ; 
(xx) Recalling the importance of maintaining, in any future parliamentary system required to supervise 
a common foreign security and defence policy, the possibility of bringing together delegations from the 
parliaments of member countries in an Assembly which represents the will of the peoples of Europe in this 
particular area, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Carefully prepare the intergovernmental conference planned for 1996 in line with its declaration 
I D8 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty; 
2. Fully associate the Assembly with the Council's reflection on its preparation for the 1996 conference; 
3. Retain the modified Brussels Treaty so that all the members of the European Union will be able to 
accede to its provisions; 
4. Seek, in conjunction with the authorities of the European Union, to clear up the ambiguities of 
Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty with a view to obtaining a general mandate to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions on behalf of the Union in WED's area of responsibility; 
5. Reconsider the WEU declaration IT annexed to the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing the 
European members of NATO which are not members of the European Union the right to accede to the 
modified Brussels Treaty; 
6. Encourage all member countries of the European Union and those acceding to it to become full 
members of Western European Union; 
7. Study the possibility of creating a WEU peace-keeping training centre on the basis of experience 
gained in this area by the Nordic countries and especially Finland; 
8. Improve the information communicated to the Assembly on developments in the CFSP and the 




(submitted by Mr. Fe"ari, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. During the period from December 1991 to 
November 1993, in which it was uncertain when 
and if the Maastricht Treaty would be ratified, the 
ministerial organs of Western European Union 
concentrated on the development of working rela-
tions with NATO, whereas WEU's relationship 
with the European Union had been left in limbo as 
Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
described it in his speech at the last plenary ses-
sion of the WEU Assembly on 29th November 
1993. 
2. During the abovementioned period, the 
Assembly continually reminded the Council of 
the importance of preparing a WEU position on 
its future relations with the Union as witnessed in 
particular by the reports presented by Mr. Goerens 
on WEU after Maastricht 1, European security 
policy - reply to the thirty-seventh annual report 
of the Council; Part one: European Union, WEU 
and the consequences of Maastricht 2, and on the 
interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty 3• 
3. Nevertheless, now faced with the situation 
after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
on 1st November 1993, the problems seem far 
from crystal-clear. In answer to a question put by 
Mr. Rathbone at the last plenary session of the 
Assembly about whether an increasing role for 
WEU in the formation of foreign policy in the 
context of the European Union could be seen, the 
WEU Secretary-General replied: 
"I do not know how the relationship (with 
the European Union) will develop. I was a 
bit disappointed that the European Union 
did not envisage the possibility of a WEU 
role in Yugoslavia at the meeting which it 
had on 22nd November before our ministe-
rial meeting. However, that is something 
which we must consider ... 
We shall be able to make a contribution to 
European Union deliberations, but the 
emphasis in political terms will be on a 
common foreign and security policy, 
because only the European Union is 
capable of providing convergence in rela-
1. Document 1308, 13th May 1992. 
2. Document 1342, Part One, 6th November 1992. 
3. Document 1369, 24th May 1993. 
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tion to a political and foreign policy and to 
the economic measures that we can take in 
terms of sanctions or of support- the coun-
tries of Central Europe have much more 
need of economic support than of the mili-
tary measures which have been envisaged 
or the guarantees that have been requested. 
We have to look at this in the framework of 
the interesting arrangements by which 
WEU is an integral part of the European 
Union but at the same time maintains its 
autonomy as long as not all members of the 
Union are prepared to engage in military 
activities. If Austria, Finland and Sweden 
join, we shall have even more observers. 
We can act either in the context of a full 
foreign and security policy or in an autono-
mous role. The situation is not entirely 
neat, but international relations are never 
100% neat and I think that this is a fairly 
ingenious arrangement. Then, in 1996, we 
shall see whether we need to take new steps 
or whether we can continue this arrange-
ment for a further two years." 
4. Of course, it will not be possible to wait 
until 1996. In fact, Western European Union is 
now faced with manifold challenges: 
- it has to find and implement practical 
arrangements for a working relationship 
between WEU and the European Union; 
- Article J .4 of the Maastricht Treaty 
which enables the European Union to 
request WEU to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions of the Union 
having defence implications has to be 
implemented; 
- the consequences of WEU' s new role in 
the development of the Union for its 
relationship with NATO have to be iden-
tified; 
- the consequences for WEU of the 
Union's enlargement to include Austria, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden have to be 
elaborated; 
- the parallelism between the Union and 
Western European Union regarding the 
nature of their new relationship with 
Central Europe on the one hand, and 
with Russia and the countries of the 
Community of Independent States (CIS) 
on the other has to be transformed into a 
specific policy; 
- WEU has to elaborate here and now a 
doctrine regarding its contribution to the 
intergovernmental conference planned 
for 1996 and it must be fully involved in 
the preparation of this conference. 
5. The Assembly has to recall that, accor-
ding to the agreement on the status of Western 
European Union signed in Paris on 
11th May 1955 and ratified by all member par-
liaments, the organisation of " Western Euro-
pean Union" comprises the Council, its subsi-
diary bodies and the Assembly. The Assembly 
therefore, on the basis of Article IX of the 
modified Brussels Treaty and the abovementio-
ned convention, is included in all measures 
envisaged by the WEU declaration annexed to 
the Maastricht Treaty, in particular regarding 
paragraph 3 of that declaration stating that " the 
objective is to build up WEU in stages as the 
defence component of the European Union. To 
this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the 
European Union, to elaborate and implement 
decisions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications ". In the same way, 
Article J .4 of the Maastricht Treaty, considering 
Western European Union as an integral part of 
the development of the Union, applies to the 
WEU Assembly as an organ of the WEU orga-
nisation. The Assembly has therefore a major 
task to fulfil in the framework of Title V and 
in particular of Article J .4 of the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
II. The consequences of the ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty for Western European Union 
(i) The new quality of co-operation between WEU 
and the European Union 
6. During the first half of 1993 (covered by 
the first part of the thirty-ninth annual report of 
the Council to the Assembly 4), the process of rati-
fication of the Maastricht Treaty was still pen-
ding. The Council's indications regarding WED's 
future role in the process of European Union were 
confmed to the following: 
" Both at the level of the Council working 
groups and at that of the Secretariat, wor-
king links may be forged as required with 
the European institutions ... having due 
regard to the principles of transparency, 
complementarity and reciprocity. These 
links will assume even greater importance 
in the months to come ... as the Maastricht 
Treaty ratification process is brought to a 
conclusion. " 
4. Document 1397, 12th November 1993. 
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7. However a study of the second part of the 
thirty-ninth annual report of the Council 5 yields 
no concrete information as to how WEU intends 
to organise its new responsibilities in the frame-
work of the European Union, other than a repeti-
tion of the wording of the relevant provisions of 
the Maastricht Treaty and of the declaration 
issued by the WEU Ministerial Council in 
Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993. 
8. This declaration drew the following conse-
quences from the entry into force of the Treaty on 
European Union. First, in a political assessment: 
" Ministers welcomed the fact that the links 
now established between the European 
Union and WEU were such that concrete 
form could now be given to the definition 
of a global concept of security in accord-
ance with the aims and conditions of the 
Maastricht Treaty and recalled that Euro-
pean security included political, economic 
and military aspects. In parallel, WEU 
would continue to develop its activities on 
the basis of the guidelines established in the 
Maastricht and Petersberg declarations. In 
so doing, WEU would also contribute to the 
framing of common European defence 
policy. This might, in time, lead to a com-
mon defence. Thus WEU would reinforce 
the dynamic process of European Union. " 
9. Furthermore, they: 
" acknowledged the importance for WEU 
of the conclusions reached by the heads of 
state and government at the European 
Council in Brussels on 29th October on the 
implementation of the common foreign and 
security policy of the European Council of 
the European Union " and " reaffirmed that 
WEU was fully prepared to play its role in 
accordance with the Treaty on European 
Union and the Maastricht declaration of 
WEU member states and to respond to 
requests from the Union concerning its 
decisions and actions having defence impli-
cations." 
10. Does that mean that, with the entry into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty, Western European 
Union has ceased to be an autonomous organisa-
tion and to act as such? The Luxembourg declara-
tion of the WEU Council is far from clear in this 
respect. It confirms only that " in parallel, WEU 
would continue to develop its activities on the 
basis of the guidelines established in the Maas-
tricht and Petersberg declarations ". In the second 
part of its thirty-ninth annual report however, the 
Council confirms that WEU is being developed 
" as an institutionally autonomous body" as the 
5. Document 1411, 5th April1994. 
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defence component of the European Union and 
the European pillar of the alliance. Furthermore, 
according to a declaration of the WEU Secretary-
General during the last plenary session of the 
Assembly in Paris, WEU will maintain its auto-
nomy "as long as not all members of the Union 
are prepared to engage in military activities". 
11. But none of these declarations names the 
modified Brussels Treaty as the fundamental 
basis of WEU' s autonomous legal existence and 
activity. It is a matter of fact that references by 
the WEU Council to that treaty have almost 
disappeared from WEU's recent public docu-
ments and declarations. Neither in WEU's last 
Luxembourg declaration, nor in the second part 
of the Council's thirty-ninth annual report can 
any reference be found to the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
12. These omissions enhance suspicions that 
the Council, firmly insisting arbitrarily on a so-
called " 1998 deadline " for the modified Brussels 
Treaty, is doing everything to give the public the 
impression that this treaty and its obligations may 
be increasingly neglected. 
13. Nevertheless, in the platform on European 
security interests adopted in The Hague on 
27th October 1987, which is one of the docu-
ments new member states must accept if they 
wish to accede to WEU 6, WEU ministers had 
rightly stressed the importance of the modified 
Brussels Treaty for building an integrated 
Europe. 
14. If this part of The Hague platform is still 
valid, it will be necessary for the WEU Council 
to give a clear indication of how WEU will har-
monise its new obligations under the Maastricht 
Treaty with those under the modified Brussels 
Treaty. Yet the way the authors of the Maastricht 
Treaty have regulated the role of WEU within the 
Union does not facilitate this task since the wor-
ding of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, and in 
particular of paragraph 6 of Article J.4 indicates 
that their clear intention was to base the European 
Union on the abrogation of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
15. Here it might be recalled that in Recom-
mendation 517 the Assembly asked the Council to 
request signatory states to correct the error in 
paragraph 6 of Article J .4 of the Maastricht 
Treaty (referring to a non-existent Article Xll of 
the Brussels Treaty) before the text was submitted 
for ratification. However, both in the English text 
of the Maastricht Treaty issued by the office for 
official publications of the European Communi-
ties in Luxembourg and in the French text publi-
shed by the same office the error was not correc-
6. Petersberg declaration, 19th June 1992, Chapter ill B. 
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ted. Thus the relevant paragraph still reads as fol-
lows: 
" with a view to furthering the objective of 
this treaty, and having in view the date of 
1998 in the context of Article XII of the 
Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this 
article may be revised.. . on the basis of a 
report to be presented in 1996 ... " 
16. Your Rapporteur therefore deems it neces-
sary to repeat that paragraph 31 of the Goerens 
report on WEU after Maastricht 7 is still fully 
valid when it states: 
" As everyone knows, the Brussels Treaty 
is no longer in force since it was modified 
by the 1954 Paris Agreements, but the 
Article Xll in question is an article of the 
modified Brussels Treaty taken from 
Article X of the Brussels Treaty. The 
governments continue, therefore, to encou-
rage confusion between the two treaties as 
your Rapporteur has already had the oppor-
tunity to underline, because, if it is the 
modified Brussels Treaty that is referred to, 
the date indicated would be 2004 and not 
1998." 
17. Regarding the WEU Council's negative 
reaction to the various written questions and its 
replies to Recommendations 517 and 539 on the 
interpretation of Article Xll of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, one has to come to the conclusion that 
the Council is not prepared to consider the various 
legal arguments put forward by the Assembly nor 
to refer the question to independent arbitration. In 
the absence of a system of legal protection in the 
framework of the modified Brussels Treaty, the 
Assembly maintains its position and reserves the 
right to take further appropriate measures to 
uphold its legal and political position in this 
important matter. The aggravating factor of this 
question is that it is not only an internal dispute 
between the WEU Council and the Assembly but 
that it had fundamental consequences for the wor-
ding of the relevant provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty. We are thus faced with a strange and per-
haps unique case where the contracting parties of 
a new treaty (the one governing the European 
Union) impose a binding interpretation for a spe-
cific clause of the treaty of another organisation 
which has different origins and signatories. This 
is even less understandable, as there seems to be 
no unanimity among governments on this ques-
tion. For instance in a debate on WEU in the Bri-
tish House of Commons on 18th March 1994, the 
representative of the British Government said that 
the modified Brussels Treaty would not terminate 
in 1998. 
7. Document 1308, 13th May 1992. 
18. However, with the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty on 1st November 1993, WEU 
obtained a supplementary legal basis for its activi-
ties, the implementation of which raises the ques-
tion of how they are to be harmonised with the 
obligations laid down in the modified Brussels 
Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty (Article B of Title I 
and Article J.4 of Title V) distinguishes between 
"common foreign and security policy", "com-
mon defence policy " and " common defence ", 
specifying that " the Union requests Western 
European Union (WEU), which is an integral part 
of the development of the Union, to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union 
which have defence implications. " That means 
that the Maastricht Treaty restricts WEU's com-
petence to purely defence matters, whereas the 
common foreign and security policy is confined to 
the Union in the framework of the institutionali-
sed common foreign and security policy (CFSP). 
The area of competence remaining within WEU 
seems even more restricted since the Maastricht 
Treaty specifies that: 
" The common foreign and security policy 
shall include all questions related to the 
security of the Union, including the even-
tual framing of a common defence policy, 
which might in time lead to a common 
defence." (Article J.4,1). 
19. What does this mean? The conclusions of 
the presidency of the European Council, pub-
lished at its meeting in Brussels on 29th Octo-
ber 1993, provides the following explanation: 
" Common foreign and security policy is 
the framework which must enable the 
Union to fulfil the hopes born at the end of 
the cold war and the new challenges gene-
rated by the upheavals on the international 
scene, with the resultant instability in areas 
bordering the Union. The aim of the com-
mon foreign and security policy is to enable 
the Union to speak with a single voice and 
to act effectively in the service of its inter-
ests and those of the international commu-
nity in general. 
Foreign and security policy covers all 
aspects of security. European security will, 
in particular, be directed at reducing risks 
and uncertainties which might endanger the 
territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of the Union and its member states, 
their democratic character, their economic 
stability and the stability of neighbouring 
regions. In this context Western European 
Union will shortly implement the various 
provisions embodied in the treaty and the 
statement on WEU. 
20. In another document on the implementa-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty, published at the 
7 
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same time under the title " Chapter IV: From poli-
tical co-operation to the common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) " one can find a slightly 
different wording: 
" (a) The common foreign and security 
policy of the European Union covers all 
areas of security and will aim to achieve the 
objectives of the Union referred to in 
Article J .1 of the treaty. Common security 
policy will be based on a global concept of 
security. European security includes politi-
cal, economic and military aspects, under 
the conditions laid down in Article J .4. It 
will be primarily aimed at reducing the 
risks and uncertainties likely to pose a 
threat to the territorial integrity and politi-
cal independence of the Union and its 
member states, to its democratic character, 
its economic stability and the stability of its 
neighbouring regions. 
(b) The Union has means at its disposal, 
backed up by contributions from the mem-
ber states and the " acquis" of political co-
operation, to achieve its security objectives, 
particularly in the areas of crisis manage-
ment, the promotion of United Nations and 
CSCE principles, disarmament, non-prolife-
ration and the economic aspects of security. 
In some cases, measures may be taken by 
the Union itself. The Union can also take 
action with regard to security through mul-
tilateral diplomacy within international 
organisations such as the United Nations, 
the CSCE and the Council of Europe. 
(c) A common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence, 
must eventually be framed by the Union on 
the basis of its security interests. CFSP pro-
ceedings conducted with a view to the 1996 
intergovernmental conference will benefit 
from the development of the activities of 
WEU, which forms an integral part of the 
development of the Union. 
The links between the Union and WEU 
established by Article J.4 of the treaty are 
such that the Union can now give concrete 
form to the global approach to security 
meeting the treaty's objectives. These links 
will be of a developing nature and must be 
reviewed in the light of the report to be sub-
mitted in 1996. 
The Union notes that WEU is continuing to 
develop its own line of activity autono-
mously on the basis of the guidelines 
established in the Petersberg declaration 
and that, in the dynamics of the process of 
European Union, it is destined to become 
its defence component. " 
DOCUMENT 1417 
21. Despite the various references to WEU in 
these declarations of the European Council, the 
WEU Council has offered the Assembly not the 
slightest information or explanation regarding 
these documents, on what basis the Union made 
them and if and to what extent WEU is bound by 
them. 
22. Furthermore, the second part of the thirty-
ninth annual report of the Council provides no 
clear position regarding WEU's remaining com-
petences. It states that: 
" the first six months of the Luxembourg 
presidency of the WEU Council brought 
further progress in the creation of a Euro-
pean defence policy. The aim of this major 
and long-haul task is to equip Europe with 
the means it needs to meet the challenges of 
the post-cold war era. Following the ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty, and with 
the advent of the European Union on 
1st November 1993, this task can now be 
taken forward in a new framework. " 
Does the term " new framework " mean that 
WEU's responsibility in creating a European 
defence policy has been transferred to the 
CFSP? 
23. In the absence of an official definition of 
the term " defence policy " it might be useful to 
refer to definitions used in the excellent study 
published in January 1994 by two former State 
Secretaries of the Swedish Foreign Ministry on 
the consequences for Swedish foreign and secur-
ity policy of membership or non-membership of 
the European Union. 
24. According to this study: 
" A common defence policy probably means 
co-operation concerning certain questions 
regarding the drawing up and orientations of 
national defence, for example defence doc-
trines, intelligence service, communications, 
training and equipment. " 
[f this definition is correct, it would mean that 
according to Article J .4, 1 of the Maastricht 
Treaty, WEU would no longer have competence 
in the abovementioned areas. 
25. In this context, however, it should be noted 
that the German text of Article 1.4, paragraph 2 8 
of the Maastricht Treaty does not correspond with 
the French and the English versions. The English 
words " defence implications " appear in the Ger-
man version as " verteidigungspolitische Bezii-
ge " which means " implications in the area of 
8. The text in German reads as follows: Die Union ersucht 
die Westeuropiiische Union (WEU), die integraler Bestand-
teil der Entwicklung der Europiiischen Union ist, die Ent-
scheidungen und Aktionen der Union, die verteidigungspoli-
tische Beziige haben, auszuarbeiten und durchzufiihren .... 
8 
defence policy". In an address on the role of Wes-
tern European Union in Bonn on 13th April1994, 
at a meeting of the German society for military 
technology, Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General 
of WEU, based his speech on the German version 
of the Maastricht Treaty when he said inter alia: 
"Article 1.4 of the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union provides for three phases 
in the process of evolution ofWEU. In the 
first, Western European Union is descri-
bed as forming ' an integral part of the 
development of the [European] Union' 
and as providing a link between the Euro-
pean defence identity and the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
The second phase is, ' in time ', the fram-
ing of a common European defence policy 
which, in a third phase, might lead to a 
' common defence. ' 
WEU is requested to ' elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions of the [Euro-
pean] Union which have implications in the 
area of defence policy. ' It is essential 
therefore that the Union itself does not 
conduct the defence policy but uses 
WEU for this purpose, since the ' defence 
policy ' of the European Union falls within 
WEU's area of responsibility. " 
26. Nevertheless, regarding WEU's remaining 
competence under the Maastricht Treaty, 
Article 1.4, paragraph 2 does not even constitute a 
general mandate for WEU's action but is only the 
basis for specific requests issued by the Union to 
WEU on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the Maas-
tricht Treaty deals with Western European Union 
as if the modified Brussels Treaty did not exist 
and in particular not the provision of its 
Article VIII, paragraph 3, providing that: 
" at the request of any of the high contrac-
ting parties the Council shall be immedi-
ately convened in order to permit them to 
consult with regard to any situation which 
may constitute a threat to peace, in what-
ever area this threat should arise, or a dan-
ger to economic stability. " 
27. How can this far-reaching general obligation 
be brought into line with the restrictive role the 
Maastricht Treaty reserves for WEU in Article 1.4? 
Will there remain any likelihood that a WEU mem-
ber country will make a request to convene the 
WEU Council on the basis of this article? 
28. This seems rather unlikely since the wor-
ding of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 1.4 of the 
Maastricht Treaty leave room for serious doubts 
about whether their provisions are compatible 
with the modified Brussels Treaty. Paragraph 4 
says that: 
" the policy of the Union ... shall not preju-
dice the specific character of the security 
and defence policy of certain member 
states and shall respect the obligations of 
certain member states under the North 
Atlantic Treaty ... " 
but does not mention the modified Brussels 
Treaty. Paragraph 5 stipulates that: 
" the provisions of this article shall not pre-
vent the development of closer co-opera-
tion ... in the framework of WEU .. . , provi-
ded such co-operation does not run coun-
ter to or impede that provided for in this 
title. " 
Again, the modified Brussels Treaty is not men-
tioned and co-operation within WEU is restricted 
by a proviso clause. 
29. Mter all, there is a definite danger that the 
Council of WEU might base its future activities 
exclusively on concrete requests from the Euro-
pean Union and no longer on its obligations under 
the modified Brussels Treaty. The most recent 
replies of the Council to various Assembly recom-
mendations seem to confirm this trend: in its 
reply 9 to Recommendation 548, the Council 
informed the Assembly that ... " the WEU Coun-
cil cannot allude to the decisions of European 
Community countries regarding their relations 
with the successor states to the former Yugoslav 
Federation". In its reply 10 to Recommenda-
tion 552, the Council stated: " The WEU Council 
is not competent to intervene with its members 
regarding their relations with successor states to 
the former Yugoslav Federation". In its reply 11 to 
Recommendation 554: 
" It is not within the competence of the 
WEU Council to recommend the creation 
of a European data centre nor even to dis-
cuss it. 
The Council is aware of the need to pro-
mote transparency in the transfer of equip-
ment for civilian and military use. Never-
theless, advanced technologies are outside 
the WEU Council's field of competence. 
.. . the WEU Council has no authority to 
invite member governments to give their 
political and financial backing to the Interna-
tional Centre for Science and Technology. " 
30. The Political Committee is therefore grate-
ful for Written Question 326 put to the Council by 
9. Document A!WEU/DG (94) 3, 5th April1994. 
10. Document A!WEU/DG (94) 3, 5th April1994. 
11. Document AIWEU/DG (94) 3, 5th Apri11994. 
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Mr. Goerens on 25th April 1994 12 and fully 
endorses it. While reiterating the provisions of 
Article vm, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty Mr. Goerens asked the Coun-
cil what was the basis of its abovementioned 
statements and in particular: 
" what under such circumstances are the 
topical questions that the Council regards 
itself competent to consider and deals 
with, as we are led to believe from Chap-
ter 11 of the second part of the thirty-ninth 
annual report? Has the Council not for 
many years devoted its meetings mainly to 
bilateral relations between member coun-
tries and non-member countries of the 
organisation? Does the Council consider 
that its competences have been modified 
since reactivation of WEU and, if so, by 
what acts?" 
31. In paragraph 8 of the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 548: 
" on the question of possible fmancial com-
pensation for riparian countries implemen-
ting the Danube embargo, the Council 
would inform the Assembly that this issue 
does not come within the competence of 
the WEU Permanent Council. " 
32. This kind of argument for not needing to 
reply to a recommendation of the Assembly is 
absolutely inacceptable. Such a non-answer 
should be the subject of an urgent approach to the 
chairmanship-in-office if the Council is unable to 
provide, in due time, a satisfactory answer to 
paragraph 4 of Written Question 326 put by 
Mr. Goerens in which he asked what was the basis 
of the Council's statement that: 
" The Permanent Council has separate com-
petences from those attributed to the Coun-
cil by the modified Brussels Treaty and that 
the Council need not reply to recommenda-
tions from the Assembly if the Permanent 
Council does not discuss the questions 
addressed by such recommendations (Reply 
to Recommendations 548 and 554). 
Does the Council no longer admit it should 
reply to Assembly recommendations dea-
ling with the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, even if certain WEU com-
petences are entrusted to other organisa-
tions? What is the point of exchanges bet-
ween WEU and NATO or the European 
Union if they do not permit the Council to 
make such reply, despite the fact that it 
undertook to do so before such exchanges 
were organised?" 
12. Document A/WEU/DG (94) 11, 25th April 1994. 
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33. This question is the more justified if one 
considers the lack of or incomplete information 
from the Council regarding a number of practical 
decisions which WEU ministers reached in 
Luxembourg. First they: 
" endorsed the measures to ensure close co-
operation between the European Union and 
WEU set out in Annex IV of Chapter IV of 
the conclusions of the General Affairs 
Council of 26th October on the implemen-
tation of the Treaty on European Union, 
which had been approved by the European 
Council on 29th October. " 
34. In fact on 27th October 1993, WEU issued 
the following press release: 
"At its meeting on 26th October 1993, the 
WEU Permanent Council mandated the 
Luxembourg presidency to convey to the 
European Council on 29th October its 
agreement to the text of Annex IV - on the 
links between the Union and WEU- to 
Chapter IV of the document on the imple-
mentation of the Maastricht Treaty " 
35. Since the Assembly was not informed of 
the contents or context of these documents, 
Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Political Commit-
tee, put the following Question 324 to the Council 
on 8th November 1993: 
" Is the Council prepared to communicate 
to the Assembly Annex IV, relating to the 
links between the Union and WEU, of 
Chapter IV of the document concerning the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty 
which was approved on 26th October 1993, 
as announced in a press communique dated 
27th October?" 
36. In a letter dated 23rd March 1994- nearly 
six months later - the Secretary-General of WEU 
transmitted the relevant document 13 with the fol-
lowing reply of the Council: 
" ... This annex was formally approved by 
the Permanent Council on 26th October 
1993 and that approval endorsed by the 
Ministerial Council on 22nd November 
last. This text is a joint European Union and 
WEU working document. The Council 
invites the Secretary-General to forward 
Annex IV to the parliamentary Assembly. " 
37. If this text is a joint European Union and 
WEU working document, one has to ask why it 
has not been incorporated in the second part of the 
thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the 
Assembly or transmitted, in time, in an official 
way to the Assembly, whereas the European Par-
13. Document 1412, 8th April1994. 
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liament was informed of the text already in 
November 1993. Furthermore, the text cannot be 
understood in isolation since it is part of another 
paper, called " Chapter IV of the document on the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty " 14 deal-
ing with the new procedure for the common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) which has four 
appendices, the last of which concerns Western 
European Union. 
38. Without further knowledge of the status 
and basis of Annex IV, one can only presume that 
it is based on Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, 
according to which the Council of the Union 
shall, in agreement with the institutions of WEU, 
adopt the necessary practical arrangements regar-
ding requests emanating from the Union to WEU 
to elaborate and implement decisions and actions 
with defence implications. 
39. This kind of case-by-case approach led the 
WEU Secretary-General in his address to the 
Assembly on 29th November 1993, to express the 
wish " that requests from the Union should be 
made at a sufficiently early stage so that WEU, 
which brings together the Foreign and Defence 
Ministers' viewpoints, can beneficially influence 
the development of the common foreign and secu-
rity policy. " 
40. In this context, the abovementioned 
Annex IV provides the following specifications: 
" The Union may, at the level of its Coun-
cil, request WEU to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions which have 
defence implications in the following kind 
of situations. These, while normally 
implying the use of military personnel, may 
include the use of other means. The follow-
ing examples should only be considered as 
indicative and non exhaustive: 
- the security interests of the Union are 
directly concerned; 
- the Union is politically and economically 
involved in a specific crisis or conflict and 
acknowledges that additional WEU sup-
port is necessary (military observers, 
cease-fire, peace-keeping, sanctions 
monitoring and peace-enforcement); 
- the Union is asked by the UN/CSCE to 
make a contribution and it comes to the 
conclusion that WEU, in a cohesive divi-
sion of labour, could make a specific 
contribution; 
- humanitarian efforts need logistical sup-
port." 
14. See paragraph 20 above. 
41. Annex IV stipulates then that: 
"2. Once the European Union has reques-
ted WEU to elaborate and implement its 
decisions and actions with defence implica-
tions, WEU will take on the request in accor-
dance with the decision-making procedures 
of that organisation, and will carry out all 
actions concerning such a request in a man-
ner that is fully coherent with the overall 
policy established by the European Union. 
Special attention will be required when the 
request to WEU is part of a broader action 
which the Union itself will continue to 
conduct. 
In this case mutual information and consul-
tation procedures will ensure the coherence 
of the action as a whole, whilst ensuring 
that WEU take in an autonomous way the 
operational decisions, including military 
planning, rules of engagement, command 
structures, deployment and withdrawal. " 
42. Such arrangements can only strengthen the 
firm impression that WEU's role is to be reduced to 
little more than that of a subordinate organisation 
and subcontractor, awaiting instructions from the 
European Union. Thus, it is anticipated, for 
example, that requests for a European contribution 
from the United Nations and the CSCE would be 
addressed only to the European Union which 
would decide whether WEU should be involved or 
not and which would also decide what kind of 
contribution WEU should make. The same line is 
followed by the Council's reply to Recommenda-
tion 549 on political relations between the United 
Nations and WEU, which envisages any activities 
by WEU in this context only via the European 
Union. Under these circumstances, nobody seems 
to consider that the United Nations and/or the 
CSCE might contact WEU directly in order to ask 
for a contribution. Not only would this be more 
practical, it would correspond more accurately to 
the specific duties and competences of WEU ari-
sing from the modified Brussels Treaty. Otherwise, 
what practical use would it be for WEU ministers 
to instruct the Permanent Council of WEU " to 
consider how to enhance relations with the United 
Nations and the CSCE" as reported in the second 
part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council? 
43. Regarding the other examples referred to in 
Annex IV it should be stressed that in all cases 
where "the security interests of the Union are 
directly concerned" or "the Union is politically 
and economically involved in a specific crisis or 
conflict ", the provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty are automatically applicable, obliging WEU 
member countries to take appropriate action. 
44. However, the implementation of the proce-
dure provided for under Annex IV will, first and 
foremost, lengthen the decision-making process 
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and make it more cumbersome. The result will 
effectively represent the lowest common denomi-
nator. A specific example of this is the request 
made in Luxembourg on 4th October by ministers 
of the Twelve to study, concerning the administra-
tion of Mostar, what support WEU could give in 
connection with the organisation of a police force 
and the improvement of some vital logistic func-
tions, particularly in the medical field 15 • 
45. Another, much more serious consequence 
is that every decision by the Union as to whether 
or not to request a contribution from WEU will 
depend on the approval of those member coun-
tries of the European Union that are not prepared 
to become full members of WEU and to fulfil the 
obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty. If the 
accession of the EFfA countries to the European 
Union is ratified, the number of member countries 
of the European Union not prepared to become 
full members of WEU will soon increase. Thus 
future action of WEU will soon depend on the 
positions adopted by all these countries. 
46. If such dependence on the part of WEU is 
not the intention of Annex IV, the WEU Council 
should quickly provide the necessary clarifications 
and explanations. If the possibility of autonomous 
decisions and actions on the basis of the modified 
Brussels Treaty shall remain open to WEU, it is 
not sufficient to confirm that WEU will be develo-
ped as an " institutionally autonomous " 
body 16• To avoid the decision-making process in 
the European Union, particularly with regard to 
countries not prepared to participate in a common 
defence in the framework of WEU, hampering 
decisions on whether to request a contribution 
from WEU, it would make more sense to interpret 
Article 1.4, paragraph 2, as a general clause obli-
ging WEU, in all cases with defence implications, 
to take the necessary initiatives on behalf of the 
Union in elaborating (and implementing) the rele-
vant decisions. Instead of waiting for specific 
requests from the Union it should be for WEU to 
propose the appropriate measures to the Union in 
any given case. In cases where the Union could not 
reach a decision WEU should be free to act on its 
own initiative. This should have been the content 
of the " necessary practical arrangements " refer-
red to in the second sentence of Article J.4, para-
graph 2, of the Maastricht Treaty. 
47. Annex IV also provides that: 
"3. In order to ensure close co-operation 
between WEU and the European Union, 
the following measures will be implemen-
ted from the date of entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty: 
15. See WEU press release, 5th October 1993, Document 
1411, Annex 1. 
16. See introduction to the second part of the thirty-ninth 
annual report of the Council to the Assembly, Document 1411. 
DOCUMENT 1417 
3.1. Co-operation between presidencies 
and harmonisation of their duration 
The presidency of WEU will contin-
uously inform CFSP bodies about 
ongoing work within WEU which is 
relevant to the Union. The presidency 
of the Council will inform, on a regular 
basis, competent WEU bodies of the 
work undertaken by the Union which 
is relevant to WEU, in particular in 
areas where WEU could be invited to 
elaborate and implement decisions of 
the Union which have defence impli-
cations. 
The two presidencies will co-operate 
closely in order to ensure the consis-
tency and the efficiency of the work 
relevant to both organisations. 
To facilitate the envisaged harmonisa-
tion of presidencies, the Union sug-
gests that WEU reflect on the reduc-
tion of its presidency's term of office 
to six months. " 
48. Regarding this last item, WEU ministers 
agreed in Luxembourg to reduce the period of the 
WEU presidency to six months from 
1st July 1994 as suggested by the European Coun-
cil. They requested the Permanent Council to 
consider further the question of harmonising the 
presidencies of the European Union and WEU 
and to report back. It should be noted in this 
context that in the Rome declaration of Octo-
ber 1984 WEU ministers had decided to prolong 
the period of its presidency from six months to 
one year, in order to render the presidency more 
effective! According to the second part of the 
thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, the 
reduction in the term of the WEU presidency 
" symbolises the willingness to harmonise WEU's 
method of working with that of the European 
Union". Do such statements mean that the Coun-
cil of WEU is itself not convinced of the useful-
ness of its decisions? 
49. Regarding further practical modalities of 
co-operation the following details are set out in 
the abovementioned document: 
"3.2. Co-operation between the Secreta-
riat-General of the Council and the Secreta-
riat-General of Western European Union 
- the Secretary-General of the Council will 
ensure that the Secretary-General of 
WEU is kept timely and fully informed 
on developments of the CFSP, in particu-
lar in areas where WEU could be invited 
to elaborate and implement decisions of 
the Union which have defence implica-
tions as well as in areas where comple-
mentary or similar activities are being 
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carried out by the Union and by WEU. 
Similarly, the Secretary-General of 
WEU will keep the Secretary-General of 
the Council punctually and fully infor-
med of any activities of WEU which are 
relevant to the Union, including the 
development of contingency planning 
for implementing measures in areas 
where the Union might call for such 
action. 
- The collaboration includes the exchange 
of written material in the relevant areas. 
This covers documents as well as 
exchanges over the WEUCOM and 
COREU networks. The two secretariats 
will establish the necessary practical 
arrangements in this regard and ensure 
the security classifications and provi-
sions of the two organisations are respec-
ted in the handling of such documents. 
- The collaboration includes cross-partici-
pation of collaborators from the two 
secretariats in relevant meetings in the 
two organisations according to decisions 
taken on a case-by-case basis, after 
consultation of the two presidencies at 
the appropriate level. This applies to 
meetings at working group level, as well 
as with regard to relevant agenda points 
in meetings at ambassadorial level and at 
ministerial level. The two secretariats 
will keep each other informed about the 
agendas for all relevant meetings. The 
collaborators in question will be seated in 
the delegation of the presidency-in-office 
of the organisation they represent. " 
50. Regarding co-operation between the two 
secretariats, it would appear that initial arrange-
ments have been made for the exchange of docu-
ments drawn up by the different working groups 
and for cross-participation of collaborators. As far 
as the latter is concerned, it seems that the secre-
tariat of the Council of the European Union may 
participate in all meetings of the WEU Council of 
Ministers whereas the arrangement for participa-
tion by the Secretariat-General of WEU in meet-
ings of the Council of the European Union is not 
entirely reciprocal as it is restricted to certain 
items of its agenda only: 
" 3.3. Arrangements for appropriate moda-
lities to ensure that the Commission of the 
European Communities is regularly infor-
med and, as appropriate, consulted on 
WEU activities 
The information and, as appropriate, the 
consultation of the Commission on WEU 
activities should take place through regular 
contacts between the Commission and the 
WEU presidency, on the one side, and bet-
ween the Commission and the Secretary-
General ofWEU, on the other side. 
The WEU secretariat will forward WEU 
written material to the Commission, in 
which the Commission has an interest by 
virtue of its responsibilities in implemen-
ting policies of the European Union and 
whenever WEU is dealing with matters 
relating to the Commission's responsibili-
ties under the Treaty on European Union. 
Similarly, the Commission will forward 
documents to WEU in all relevant areas. " 
51. It appears that in the meantime the Com-
mission and the Secretariat-General ofWEU have 
agreed on the modalities of the exchange of docu-
ments. Furthermore, it has been clarified that the 
Commission is to be included in the delegation of 
the presidency of the European Union to WEU 
meetings and form part of the delegations of the 
presidency of the European Union to WEU minis-
terial meetings. Conversely, the Commission will 
regularly inform the WEU secretariat of meetings 
organised by the Commission which might be of 
interest to WEU. Attendance by the WEU Secre-
tariat-General at such meetings is to be requested 
through the presidency of WEU: 
" The presidency will represent the Euro-
pean Union at WEU meetings. It is under-
stood that the presidency will include 
representatives of the Commission in its 
delegation whenever WEU is dealing with 
matters relating to the Commission's res-
ponsibilities under the treaty. " 
52. It is not made clear in the paper how the 
presence of WEU in European Union meetings 
will be ensured. According to an Agence France 
Presse communique dated 3rd March 1994, the 
Secretary-General of WEU complained that rela-
tions between WEU and the European Union 
were less satisfactory than those with NATO and 
that WEU was not represented in meetings of the 
Twelve dealing with security matters. On 
18th April 1994 however, Agence Europe relea-
sed information stating it had been decided that 
WEU would be represented by its Secretary-
General and by a representative of the WEU pre-
sidency at the meeting of the European Union to 
be held in Brussels on 17th and 18th May. Such a 
decision is of course to be welcomed, but the 
representation of WEU in such meetings should 
not be the subject of ad hoc decisions but based on 
an overall agreement: 
" 3.4. Synchronisation of dates and venues 
of meetings 
The two organisations, at the level of the 
presidency and the secretariats, will when-
ever possible consult each other before 
finalising plans for meetings at ministerial 
level or meetings of relevant working 
13 
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groups with a view to establishing the grea-
test possible synchronisation of dates and 
venues of meetings. This applies in particu-
lar to situations where successive decisions 
of the Union and WEU are called for. 
The two secretariats will make the neces-
sary practical arrangements to provide 
appropriate meeting facilities whenever suc-
cessive meetings of the two organisations on 
the same day and in the same place are cal-
led for practical or operational reasons. " 
53. According to information your Rapporteur 
gathered during a visit to the European Commis-
sion and the WEU Secretariat-General in Brussels 
in March, the discussions for implementing the 
various arrangements are only just starting. 
Unfortunately the Secretariat-General of the 
European Union which has to be reorganised, was 
not able to receive your Rapporteur. He therefore 
has no detailed information about the background 
of the abovementioned Annex IV. But he recalls 
that in Chapter A of the declaration of Western 
European Union annexed to the Maastricht Treaty 
dealing with WEU's relations with European 
Union, WEU announced that" the WEU Council 
shall, in agreement with the competent bodies of 
the European Union, adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements. " Will this still be done or has it 
become obsolete by agreeing to the Union's 
paper? 
54. Should this be the case, it would be a fur-
ther example of the consequences of the inactiv-
ity of the WEU Council in allowing the Union to 
impose its practical arrangements and provisions 
in matters which are within WEU's specific pur-
view. If WEU is to avoid losing the basis of its 
responsibilities and competences, it will be cru-
cial to remind the Council that it must continue to 
implement fully all provisions of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and not restrict WEU's area of 
activities to obligations arising from specific 
requests stemming from the European Union 
alone. The far-reaching obligations of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty also make it impossible to 
reduce WEU's activities to defence matters alone. 
Threats to peace are not just military threats; they 
also include political, economic and other threats 
and dangers. 
55. What is even more important is that WEU 
must be both the subject and a player in the elabo-
ration of the institutional architecture of the secu-
rity and defence branch of the European Union. In 
this respect, WEU has so far been more an object 
than a subject of reflexion. WEU must put for-
ward its own vision of the future European 
construction; the modified Brussels Treaty itself 
obliges the Council to make a proper contribution 
in this area, since its Article vm, paragraph 1 
clearly provides that the Council of WEU had 
been created for the purposes ... " of promoting 
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unity and encouraging the progressive integration 
of Europe and closer co-operation between them 
and with other European organisations " even 
before the European Community was created and 
a long time before the Maastricht Treaty was 
concluded. 
56. That means first and foremost that the 
Council should now do what it should have done 
already during the preparation of the Maastricht 
Treaty: it must decide on its approach to the 
1996 intergovernmental conference. During his 
recent visit to Brussels, your Rapporteur was 
told that WEU instances were too busy with 
their heavy day-to-day duties to have the time to 
think now about the 1996 conference. That 
enhances the need to think about improving 
WED's means of ensuring continuous political 
planning. First, however, the Council and the 
Secretariat-General must realise the importance 
of being involved in the planning for 1996 from 
the very outset. 
57. Furthermore, it is crucial to remind the 
Council that with the entry into force of the Maas-
tricht Treaty WED's activities are closely connec-
ted with those of the European Union and the 
structures of the CFSP. In the framework of the 
latter, subjects connected with the responsibilities 
of WEU and practical co-operation with it will 
play an increasingly important role. The exchange 
of information and documents will be developed. 
Consequently, the Council has to inform the 
Assembly about developments in the CFSP and 
other sectors of the Union in all matters which 
have implications for WEU and in which it is 
involved. The Council should reply to recommen-
dations of the Assembly dealing with the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if the 
exercise of certain WEU competences are entrus-
ted to other European organisations, such as the 
European Union. 
58. Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty 
created an Assembly whose activities are not just 
an echo of those of the WEU Council. They are 
based on its political independence which was 
recognised by the Council from the very outset. In 
this spirit, the Assembly was able to draw up a 
Charter which lays down that the Assembly car-
ries out the parliamentary function arising from 
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty 
and may proceed on any matter arising out of that 
Treaty. The Assembly's recommendations to the 
Council constitute the Assembly's formal answers 
to the annual report of the Council which is trans-
mitted to the Assembly in accordance with 
Article IX and reflect its formal positions on any 
matter arising from the treaty. The Assembly's 
recommendations therefore cannot be considered 
as simple " suggestions " as implied in the Coun-
cil's reply to Recommendations 548 (paragraph 6) 
and 550 (paragraph 3). 
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(ii) The parliamentary dimension of co-operation between 
WEU and the European Union 
59. The need to elaborate a WEU concept 
regarding the future place of the security and 
defence element within the future European (and 
Atlantic) institutional architecture applies also to 
the question of how democratic and parliamen-
tary supervision of the European executive insti-
tutions should be guaranteed and organised in the 
best possible way. As already stressed in para-
graph 5 of the introduction, the Assembly should 
be conscious of its special responsibility in put-
ting forward constructive proposals and recom-
mendations in this area, which is still far from 
being examined and clarified with due attention. 
Whereas the Maastricht Treaty does not refer to 
specific WEU organs but to " WEU " as an inte-
gral part of the development of the Union, the 
WEU declaration annexed to the Maastricht Trea-
ty contains encouragement for closer co-operation 
between the Assembly of WEU and the European 
Parliament. 
60. In answer to Written Questions 302 and 
303, on 16th October 1992 the Council specified 
that its: 
" encouragement of closer co-operation bet-
ween the parliamentary Assembly of WEU 
and the European Parliament is based on the 
fact that the Maastricht declaration of the 
Nine on the role of Western European Union 
and its relations with the European Union 
and with the Atlantic Alliance specifies 
under the heading 'WED's relations with 
European Union' (paragraph 3): 'The 
objective is to build up WEU in stages as the 
defence component of the European Union. 
To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request 
of the European Union, to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the 
Union which have defence implications.' 
The 'encouragement of closer co-operation 
between the parliamentary Assembly of 
WEU and the European Parliament' is one 
of the ' measures ' which 'WEU will take ... 
to develop a close working relationship with 
the Union'. " 
61. This specification is very important. Mea-
sures to develop a close working relationship with· 
the Union have to be seen in the context of 
Article 1.4 according to which WEU is an integral 
part of the Union and will, at the request of the lat-
ter, elaborate and implement decisions and 
actions of the Union which have defence implica-
tions. Consequently, all efforts to establish close 
co-operation between the Assembly of WEU and 
the European Parliament should be seen in this 
context. The objective of building up WEU in 
stages as the defence component of the European 
Union has to be implemented in its parliamentary 
component too, this being the Assembly ofWEU. 
62. That means that arrangements which need 
to be made for establishing closer relationships 
between the WEU Assembly and the European 
Parliament should take into account WED's 
enhanced responsibilities in the framework of the 
Union. They should therefore be based on a spirit 
of equality, reciprocity, transparency and comple-
mentarity. To this end, informal contacts have 
been established between the Assembly and the 
European Parliament. 
63. They led to a meeting in Paris on 
29th January 1993 at which the Political Commit-
tee of the WEU Assembly was briefed by 
Mr. De Gucht, Rapporteur of the Committee on 
Institutional Affairs of the European Parliament 
on future relations between the European Com-
munity, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. On that 
occasion, the Political Committee of the WEU 
Assembly gave its views on certain points and on 
2nd March 1993 the Presidential Committee 
adopted a declaration on the WEU Assembly's 
place in the European Union which the President 
of the WEU Assembly transmitted to the Presi-
dent of the European Parliament 17• 
64. Following an exchange of letters in 
April1993 between the Sub-committee on Secu-
rity and Disarmament of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament and the 
Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly it was 
decided to form a small group of parliamentarians 
of the Political Committee with the task of main-
taining contact with the said sub-committee of the 
European Parliament. On 15th June 1993 a meet-
ing was held between MM. Holzfuss and Laga-
kos, members of the Sub-committee on Security 
and Disarmament of the European Parliament, 
and Lord Finsberg, MM. Goerens and Stoffelen, 
members of the working group for contacts with 
the European Parliament nominated by the Politi-
cal Committee of the WEU Assembly. It was 
agreed that a formal meeting between the working 
groups of both the European Parliament and 
the WEU Assembly should be held in early 
autumn 1993, most probably in Brussels, in order 
to discuss proposals for contacts between the two 
parliamentary bodies. 
65. In fact, no such meeting was held but it was 
agreed that, in principle, all parties should be on 
an equal footing in such contacts. All participants 
agreed that the contacts could include: 
- an exchange of draft reports at an early 
stage; 
- regular contacts between rapporteurs; 
- joint meetings of committees. 
Participation in plenary sessions with the right to 
speak on a reciprocal basis was a problem which 
17. See Appendix. 
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might not be solved easily at short notice, but both 
sides agreed that constructive proposals on this 
matter should be discussed at their next meeting. 
66. On 24th February 1994, however, the Euro-
pean Parliament adopted Resolution A3-0041/94 on 
future relations between the European Union, WEU 
and the Atlantic Alliance emphasising inter alia: 
"that the primacy of the European Union 
over WEU should be confirmed unambi-
guously, with the European Union taking 
the political decisions concerning security 
and defence, with WEU implementing the 
decisions which have defence implica-
tions ... that the European Parliament may 
address questions and recommendations to 
the WEU Council " and that " in the third 
stage, the European Parliament should 
replace the WEU Assembly in its entirety 
at plenary and committee levels ... " 
67. Reading the explanatory memorandum 
attached to that resolution, the Rapporteur 
Mr. De Gucht already proposes in a first stage a 
modification of Article IX of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty in the sense that the WEU Assembly 
shall be composed of the representatives of WEU 
member countries elected to the European Parlia-
ment. Of course, this is the personal view of the 
rapporteur, but if his argument that " the WEU 
Assembly, unlike the European Parliament, is 
under the current provisions not included in the 
normal process of European integration ", 
becomes the official position of the European Par-
liament, it will be very difficult for the WEU 
Assembly to develop a working relationship with 
it because such a starting point would run counter 
to the text of the relevant provisions of the treaties 
and also to the spirit of understanding the liaison 
group of both parliamentary assemblies had 
already reached. 
68. The Assembly therefore expects that the 
Council will take appropriate steps in the frame-
work of its new working links with the inter-
governmental authorities of the European Union, 
with the European Commission and last, but not 
least, also whenever its representatives have 
contacts with members of the European Parlia-
ment. Thus the Council should make it clear that 
the planned closer relationship between the WEU 
Assembly and the European Parliament which the 
Council has encouraged the WEU Assembly to 
develop will not be possible, if the relevant ins-
tances of the Union, and in particular the Euro-
pean Parliament, continue to claim that the WEU 
Assembly, which is a component of the WEU 
organisation, is excluded from the process of 
European integration. 
69. The future structure of the parliamentary 
dimension of a European Union in which security 
and defence will take their appropriate places will 
DOCUMENT 1417 
be the subject of a carefully-prepared study the 
Political Committee is to present at a later stage. 
The committee is also ready to reopen the dia-
logue with a newly-elected European Parliament 
in order to agree appropriate ways and means for 
developing closer co-operation. The primary aim 
of these efforts should be the elaboration of ways 
to strengthen and improve democratic control 
bearing in mind the will of the peoples concerned 
in the most sensitive political area, i.e. defence 
and security. However, in pressing steadfastly for 
a single European framework for security and 
defence matters and for introducing the principle 
of majority decisions in these areas and asking to 
replace the WEU Assembly in its entirety, the 
European Parliament has never explained why all 
this would lead to greater democracy in security 
and defence matters, nor why it should lead to 
greater efficiency. The European Parliament's 
fight against the intergovernmental decision-
making process in the European Union and in 
WEU, which has been even further strengthened 
by the Maastricht Treaty, seems particularly coun-
terproductive when one considers that the true 
goal is to bring together all the nations of a conti-
nent such as Europe whose greatest quality is the 
very diversity of its peoples and countries, inclu-
ding especially the " smaller " countries and for-
mer neutral countries, which are now prepared to 
join European Union but wish nevertheless to 
retain some control over their destiny. 
(iii) European Union, WEU and NATO 
70. The problem of pressing for a single Euro-
pean framework in security and defence must also 
be examined carefully with regard to Europe's 
future transatlantic relations in these matters and 
even its relations with the United Nations. Reso-
lution A3-0041194 of the European Parliament: 
" Takes the view ... that aspects of the rela-
tionship with the United States should come 
under the responsibility of the same politi-
cal authority, which implies that the Euro-
pean Union should become responsible for 
defining the European position in the Atlan-
tic Alliance; considers that this will allow 
the development of a more consistent atti-
tude towards the United States as well as a 
less ambiguous relationship between the 
Union and the United States; 
Considers it important that ultimately, toge-
ther with the revision of the treaties leading 
to the full incorporation of WEU into the 
European Union, the existing North Atlan-
tic Treaty is adapted or a new treaty signed 
between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union to reflect better the new equal 
relationship between the two sides of the 
Atlantic." 
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71. Again, in a resolution on the " development 
of a common security and defence policy for the 
European Union" adopted on 24th March 1994, 
the European Parliament: 
"Welcomes the thought being given on 
both sides of the Atlantic to the possibility 
of anchoring all political, economic and 
defence policy relations between the Euro-
pean Union and the United States and 
Canada in a comprehensive treaty; " 
72. It cannot be the purpose of this report to 
enter into discussion of numerous reports and 
positions adopted by the European Parliament in 
the area of competence of Western European 
Union. Nevertheless your Rapporteur deems it 
necessary to emphasise that Europe's relations in 
security and defence matters with the United 
States and Canada in the framework of the Atlan-
tic Alliance are particularly sensitive and have to 
be handled most carefully. It is well known that a 
number of problems and rivalities in political and 
economic areas have arisen recently between the 
Twelve and the United States. For the security of 
Europe, it will be crucial to avoid difficulties and 
competition on either side of the Atlantic affec-
ting transatlantic solidarity in security and defen-
ce matters. Suggesting in this context to replace 
the North Atlantic Treaty by another treaty 
without specifying the purpose and the content of 
such a new arrangement can be a dangerous 
undertaking. The Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Union in no way indicates in which way the 
Union intends to develop its relations with the 
United States and with NATO other than reques-
ting that co-operation between member states 
within NATO shall not run counter to or impede 
that provided for in the Union. Again, the Union 
is already in competition and even in conflict with 
the United States, particularly in economic mat-
ters. To maintain transatlantic solidarity, it is 
therefore most important that WEU has been 
developed as the European pillar of NATO on the 
basis of Article IV of the modified Brussels Trea-
ty obliging it to work in close co-operation with 
NATO. The importance of this provision increa-
sed considerably after the January NATO summit 
meeting which explicitly supported strengthening 
the European pillar of the alliance through Wes-
tern European Union. 
73. It will be a main task of Western European 
Union to use its new working relations with the 
relevant instances of the European Union and the 
CFSP, to strengthen transatlantic cohesion and to 
advise the Union on possible repercussions of cer-
tain decisions with defence implications on trans-
atlantic co-operation. It was therefore a wise deci-
sion to confirm WEU as a separate institution 
with the task of developing co-operation with 
NATO to the benefit of the European Union as a 
whole. 
74. Both the European Union and WEU will 
also have to study the impact the establishment of 
a single European framework in the security and 
defence area would have on relations with the Uni-
ted Nations. According to Article 2 of its Charter, 
the United Nations is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its member states. When 
the Assembly recommended in Recommenda-
tion 549 that the Council study the proposals ... 
with regard to reforming the United Nations and 
its Security Council with a view to strengthening 
its effectiveness in peace-keeping and improving 
WEU's participation in the decision-making pro-
cess in the United Nations, the Council replied that 
" this issue is solely a matter for the member states 
as members of the United Nations. " 
75. Article 1.5, paragraph 4 of the Maastricht 
Treaty obliges member states which are perma-
nent members of the Security Council to ensure 
the defence of positions and the interests of the 
Union, but without prejudice to their responsibili-
ties under the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter. So far this Charter allows only individual 
sovereign member countries to become members 
of the United Nations Council. Furthermore, Uni-
ted Nations member states alone can decide indi-
vidually on the basis of their autonomous political 
evaluations and in conformity with their constitu-
tions whether or not to contribute to peace-keep-
ing or peace-enforcing operations requested or 
authorised by the United Nations. Appropriate 
parliamentary supervision of these decisions is 
becoming increasingly important. It must be car-
ried out by a parliamentary assembly whose mem-
bers should have far closer links with the deci-
sion-making process in the relevant countries than 
members of the European Parliament elected by 
direct universal suffrage could have. Neither the 
present member countries of the Union nor the 
EFTA countries now joining as new members 
with their long experience in peace-keeping in the 
framework of the United Nations would agree that 
powers to decide on sending national or multina-
tional military contingents abroad for peace-keep-
ing or peace-enforcing purposes should be trans-
ferred to supranational institutions. 
Ill. The enlargement of the European Union 
and its implications for Western European Union 
(i) The EFTA countries 
76. The recently successful negotiations with 
Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden regarding 
their accession to the European Union seemed 
particularly difficult in a number of areas but 
not in regard to foreign and security policy 
(Chapter 24 of the agreement package). Whereas 
Norway as a member of NATO had from the very 
beginning no difficulties with this chapter, the 
other three countries had so far maintained a pol-
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icy of neutrality, in each case based on different 
legal, political and historical grounds. Neverthe-
less, all three countries agreed with the European 
Union on the following joint declaration : 
77. "I. The Union notes the confirmation by 
Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway of 
their full acceptance of the rights and obli-
gations attaching to the Union and its insti-
tutional framework, known as the " acquis 
communautaire ", as it applies to present 
member states. This includes in particular 
the content, principles and political objec-
tives of the treaties, including those of the 
Treaty on European Union. 
The Union and Austria, Sweden, Finland 
and Norway agree that: 
- accession to the Union should strengthen 
the internal coherence of the Union and 
its capacity to act effectively in foreign 
and security policy; 
- the acceding states will, from the time of 
their accession, be ready and able to par-
ticipate fully and actively in the common 
foreign and security policy as defined in 
the Treaty on European Union; 
- the acceding states will, on accession, 
take on in their entirety and without 
reservation all the objectives of the 
treaty, the provisions of its Title V, and 
the relevant declarations attached to it; 
- the acceding states will be ready and able 
to support the specific policies of the 
Union in force at the time of their acces-
sion. 
Il. With regard to member states' obliga-
tions deriving from the Treaty on European 
Union concerning the implementation of 
the Union's common foreign and security 
policy, it is understood that, on the day of 
accession, the legal framework of the acce-
ding countries will be compatible with the 
acquis." 
78. In its reply to Recommendation 548 asking 
the Council to defme without delay the nature of 
its future relations with Austria, Finland and Swe-
den, offering them means of co-operation corres-
ponding to the specific situation of each one, the 
Council stated that: 
"The nature of WEU's future relations 
with Austria, Finland and Sweden depends 
on the decision which these countries will 
take regarding their relations with WEU. 
Under the terms of the declaration by 
Ministers on 19th May 1993, and at these 
countries' request, WEU has established 
the appropriate contacts with them in order 
to inform them about WEU' s role. " 
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79. Nevertheless, it would be helpful if the 
Council would clarify whether the entry of these 
countries into the European Union, once approved 
by the European Parliament and the population of 
the countries concerned, will enable them to bene-
fit from the WEU declaration appended to the 
Maastricht Treaty according to which " states 
which are members of the European Union are 
invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be 
agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if 
they so wish ". Since this declaration assumed 
that treaties and agreements corresponding to the 
above proposals would be concluded before 
31st December 1992, it has to be made clear whe-
ther the same procedure will apply to countries 
joining the European Union after that date. 
80. So far, only Austria has publicly announced 
its intention to become an observer in WEU. 
There are regular informal information contacts in 
Brussels between representatives of Austria and 
WEU representatives, but according to the infor-
mation your Rapporteur received in Brussels the 
three countries in question have made no formal 
requests regarding their future relationship with 
WEU. 
81. The Political Committee's information visit 
to Austria in March 1994 was particularly rich in 
enhancing knowledge of the country's commit-
ment to join the European " club ". It became 
clear that the Austrian authorities consider that the 
reasons for incorporating in its constitution in 
1955 a declaration of permanent neutrality have 
become more and more obsolete following the 
radical political changes in Europe since 1989. 
Austria has an important geographical position as 
a direct neighbour of three of the Visegrad coun-
tries, Slovenia and a short distance from Ukraine. 
Since the outbreak of hostilities on the territory of 
former Yugoslavia, Austria views its application 
to join the European Union increasingly from a 
security angle. It intends to become an active par-
ticipant in the development of a security policy 
within the Union and sees its future relationship 
with WEU as an evolutionary process. Further-
more it has expressed its commitment to contri-
bute to the deepening of the Union 18 • According to 
Mr. Mock, Minister for Foreign Affairs, there 
would in the long run be full identity between 
members of the Union and WEU. Austria is 
concentrating its present efforts on the European 
Union and WEU whereas the question of relations 
with NATO are not at present on the agenda of the 
political discussion. Austria considers the partner-
ship for peace programme as a positive initiative, 
but does not envisage participating in it for the 
time being. · 
18. See the contribution by Mr. Mock, Austrian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Le Monde, 30th April1994. 
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82. Austria's longstanding participation and 
experience in peace-keeping operations of the 
United Nations will constitute a valuable contri-
bution to the European Union and Western Euro-
pean Union provided the referendum on joining 
the Union, which is to be held on 12th June 1994, 
is positive. According to opinion polls conducted 
prior to the successful conclusion of the accession 
agreements, a majority was in favour of the coun-
try's accession to the Union. Gallup counted 48% 
in favour, 38% against and 14% undecided, whe-
reas Market Institute counted 39% in favour, 34% 
against and 27% undecided 19• But most recent 
opinion polls indicate more than 53% in favour, 
about 32% against and 11-14% undecided. There 
are therefore good reasons to hope that Austria 
will be the first of the four EFTA countries whose 
population will approve its entry into the Union 
which undoubtedly will have a positive impact on 
the results of the referendums to be held in the 
other three countries. 
83. In Finland 20, an opinion poll was organised 
by Finska-Gallup on 14th February 1994 accor-
ding to which 39% of those questioned were in 
favour of Finland joining the Union, 30% against 
and 31% undecided. When the Political Commit-
tee visited Finland on 25th and 26th April1994, it 
saw a country which had succeeded by its policy 
of neutrality in maintaining its national indepen-
dence next door to a superpower neighbour which 
had defeated it in war and demonstrated expan-
sionary tendencies. However, neutrality for the 
Finns was never an end in itself but only a means 
of safeguarding their national existence and secu-
rity. Ever since achieving independence from 
Russia in 1917, Finland had sought a modus 
vivendi with Moscow. For 43 years after the 
second world war, Finland was enmeshed in a 
special relationship governed by a 1948 treaty of 
friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance 
and on strong bilateral trade relations. The failure 
of the August 1991 coup in Moscow hastened the 
end of the 1948 treaty in its entirety, abrogated by 
a new treaty signed on 20th January 1992. Nego-
tiations are now expected with the Russian 
Government on trading and border questions. 
During European Union membership negotia-
tions, Finland insisted on the importance of ensu-
ring prospects for continuing and indeed develo-
ping economic co-operation with Russia. 
84. Finland's security has been greatly affected 
by the strategic game of superpower doctrines, 
weapons and deployments that was played around 
the Kola base complex and in the northern waters 
and airspace. Despite the implemented and forth-
coming deep reductions in strategic and tactical 
nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia, 
19. Le Monde, 4th March 1994. 
20. Le Monde, 4th March 1994. 
Northern Europe retains its strategic significance 
for the residual forces of the superpowers. Now 
that the Baltic states are independent, the focus of 
military policy in the Baltic has shifted from the 
Straits of Denmark to the mouth of the Gulf of 
Finland, and when the START II Treaty on the 
reduction of strategic nuclear forces comes into 
force, nearly half of Russia's nuclear capacity, 
consisting mainly of strategic missile submarines, 
will be concentrated in the Kola Peninsula. No 
matter how positive development may be in Rus-
sia, this will not change the reality that Russia's 
two most important areas from a strategic point of 
view - the Leningrad military district and the 
Kola Peninsula- are located next door to Finland. 
In the Leningrad district in particular, important 
units of Russian troops and materiel are deployed 
which had been withdrawn from Central Europe 
and Germany. 
85. On 18th April1994, Finland decided to join 
NATO's partnership for peace programme. Since 
June 1992, Finland has also an observer's status in 
NACC. Despite the large Russian military 
deployment near the Finnish borders the President 
of the Republic of Finland confirmed in a speech 
to the plenary session of the European Parliament 
on 16th November 1993: 
" Finland is not asking for a free ride in 
terms of security. We do not feel threatened 
and are not in the search for new security 
solutions. Finland pursues a policy of mili-
tary non-alliance and an independent and 
credible defence. 
In the European Union, we are fully prepa-
red to take an active part in the common 
foreign and security policy and in its fur-
ther development as foreseen in the treaty. 
We do not exclude any options. " 
86. This Finnish attitude was confirmed by the 
Foreign Minister Mr. Haaviston Tapaaminen, 
when he told the Political Committee in Helsinki 
on 25th April 1994: 
" to the extent our military security is 
concerned, maintaining military non-
alliance and an independent, credible 
defence capacity remains our point of 
departure. This is the way we have defined 
our policy of neutrality in the post-cold war 
Europe. We are prepared to participate acti-
vely and constructively in the further elabo-
ration of the defence dimension. We do not 
foreclose any options but believe it is our 
legitimate right and obligation to look at 
future arrangements from the point of view 
of our national security. 
We are engaged in an informal and useful 
dialogue with WEU at various levels. No 
decision has been taken by the government 
to formalise this relationship for the time 
19 
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being. Our priorities are very clear: we 
have to tackle with European Union acces-
sion first. Only after that can further aspects 
be considered. In this perspective, it is 
significant that there will be a referendum 
on membership some time in the autumn, 
probably in October. 
One further consideration deserves to be 
mentioned here: full membership in WEU 
implies an Article V security guarantee. We 
are not seeking one, nor would a guarantee 
be compatible with our present policy. 
Observer status in WEU, in contrast, would 
not seem to contradict the fundamentals of 
our policy. " 
Mrs. Rehn, Finnish Minister of Defence, conside-
red Finland's observer status in WEU as a mini-
mum. 
87. The Finnish Government showed that it 
was well aware of the wish of the Swedish and 
Norwegian authorities that the Finnish referen-
dum should be held earlier than in the other nordic 
countries since both Sweden and Norway counted 
on a positive vote from the Finnish population. 
Nevertheless, the Finnish authorities told the 
committee that no definite date for the referendum 
had yet been fixed. 
88. They also made clear that, apart from cer-
tain threats voiced by Mr. Zhirinovsky during a 
recent visit to Helsinki, no pressure had been 
brought to bear by the Russian Government regar-
ding Finland's ambitions to join the West. The 
Russian Defence Minister did not like to see Fin-
land joining NATO, whereas WEU was not men-
tioned. The Finnish authorities avoid discussing 
these issues with the Russian authorities in order 
to avoid giving the impression that they might 
seek Russian advice in this area. 
89. The committee's visit to the Defence 
Ministry's peace-keeping training centre in Niini-
salo was particularly interesting in the context of 
the recent decision by Finland to join the NATO 
partnership for peace programme. According to a 
Finnish press release dated 19th April1994, 
" The Finnish presentation document will 
list the forms of co-operation Finland is 
interested in within the partnership for 
peace. They are: 
- co-operation in the field of peace-
keeping, primarily providing peace-
keeping training; 
- co-operation in search and rescue as well 
as in humanitarian operations; 
- visits and educational exchange; 
- co-operation in the field of the environ-
ment." 
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90. From Finland's longstanding experience in 
peace-keeping, in particular in training, the rele-
vant European institutions such as WEU could 
find much to their advantage even if initially Fin-
land chose only observer status in WEU. In view 
of the increasing need to develop peace-keeping 
capabilities and training, a study might be made 
of the usefulness of creating such a training centre 
under the aegis of Western European Union. 
91. Regarding the position of Sweden, your 
Rapporteur was able to hold comprehensive talks 
with various governmental, parliamentary and 
scientific authorities of that country during a visit 
to Stockholm at the end of March 1994. In these 
talks he was particularly impressed by the way 
most of the Swedish speakers expressed their feel-
ing of responsibility and concern for maintaining 
the independence of the Baltic states. They parti-
cularly believed that WED's decision to grant 
enhanced status for the countries participating in 
the WEU Forum of Consultation should not 
exclude the Baltic states so that a new dividing 
line would not be drawn between Poland and 
Lithuania. These questions will be developed in 
greater detail in the following chapter dealing 
with the Central European countries. 
92. Furthermore, the Swedish analysts in the 
Defence Ministry underlined even more than the 
Finns the importance of new Russian deployment 
on the Kola Peninsula and in the Leningrad dis-
trict. In a speech at the Royal Academy of Mili-
tary Sciences, Stockholm, on 7th December 1993, 
the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Carl Bildt, 
emphasised with reference to the Kola Peninsula: 
" It is somewhat of a paradox that, although 
current developments mean that nuclear 
weapons are declining in importance and 
are being cut back, the importance of the 
Kola bases and their immediate area of 
operations will increase in step with these 
reductions. 
Developments are affected by several fac-
tors. The main ingredient is the START 11 
Treaty which was signed by the United 
States and Russia earlier this year, under 
which strategic nuclear arsenals will be cut 
back to 3 500 warheads on each side. The 
structure of these arsenals will also be 
changed, and this will result in a marked 
increase in the proportion of warheads 
deployed on submarines. In addition, the 
independence achieved by Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan, and the resultant depletion of 
Russia's ground-based missile systems, 
now means that warheads deployed on sub-
marines have become even more important. 
In combination with technological deve-
lopments which mean that only the Russian 
Navy's Northern Fleet is equipped with the 
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two most modern types of military laun-
ching submarines, this will imply that, in 
the future, slightly more than half of the 
total Russian strategic nuclear-weapon 
arsenal will be located on some ten sub-
marines based on the Kola Peninsula. " 
93. " The changes which affect our neighbour-
hood in a major way include the CFE Trea-
ty for the reduction of conventional forces 
in Europe. 
Under the CFE Treaty, Russia has two geo-
graphically distinct sections of the flank 
zone: the Leningrad military district to the 
north, and the Northern Caucasus military 
district to the south. The principle is that of 
" communicating chambers ". Thus the 
Russian areas of the flank zone have a com-
mon maximum ceiling for the volume of 
heavy military equipment permitted, but 
Russia can decide where this equipment 
should be deployed, for example with an 
emphasis on the north or the south. " 
94. In the same speech, the Swedish Prime 
Minister said that if the economic aspects have 
been an important factor for Sweden's decision to 
apply for such membership in the European Com-
munity, it was very clear that the security policy 
reasons for membership have gradually become 
stronger. Sweden wants to give the CFSP of the 
European Union a clear Northern European 
dimension. Its second objective consists of" buil-
ding up a network of co-operation and stability in 
the Baltic Sea area and between Sweden, the Bal-
tic countries and Russia, whose importance for 
developments in the North of Europe will always 
be very considerable. " As things now stand, the 
Swedish referendum on joining the Union should 
be held on 13th November 1994, the outcome of 
which seems still to be an open question. 
95. In a study entitled " A historic choice, the 
consequences for Swedish foreign and security 
policy of membership or non-membership of the 
European Union" published in January 1994 by 
two former State Secretaries of the Swedish 
Foreign Ministry at the request of the govern-
ment, the authors plead for Sweden to join the 
Union. They underline that this would not oblige 
Sweden to decide whether or not to participate in 
a common defence. The paper is part of the efforts 
made by the government to convince the popula-
tion to vote in favour of joining the Union. A last 
poll published on 13th February 1994 showed 
only 28% in favour, but 40% against joining 
whereas 28% were undecided 21 • 
21. Le Monde, 4th March 1994. 
96. Bearing in mind Sweden's longstanding 
policy of neutrality, it is understandable that neu-
trality still has important roots in Swedish public 
opinion. The decision to join the European Union 
is therefore to be considered as a fundamental 
new step in a new direction. Sweden's future rela-
tionship with WEU is largely tantamount to 
entering a whole new world. The Swedish autho-
rities therefore prefer to handle this question only 
after entering the European Union in order to have 
a possibility of influencing its development in the 
light of the intergovernmental conference of 
1996. 
97. In an interview on 11th April 1994 with 
"Die Welt", however, Mr. Bildt answered the 
question about Sweden's position towards WEU 
and the prospects it offered and whether neutra-
lity was an issue as follows: 
"Sweden's position of neutrality to date 
will not constitute an obstacle as the cir-
cumstances on which neutrality in Europe 
was based have completely changed, in the 
sense that the historical meaning and pur-
pose of neutrality disappeared with the dis-
solution of the Warsaw Pact. 
Our main interest is to help establish demo-
cratically-controlled national defence sys-
tems, based on international co-operation, 
in the former Warsaw Pact countries with 
NATO's partnership for peace initiative 
meeting their security needs. In order to do 
so, we can draw on Sweden's valuable 
experience of its own defence system and 
its participation in United Nations peace 
operations. However, the most important 
consideration for Sweden is to play an acti-
ve part in the common foreign and security 
policy, within the framework of the Euro-
pean Union, since this is participation in its 
most essential form at the heart of a policy 
aiming to extend stability and security 
throughout Europe. Once Sweden has 
become a member of the European Union, 
we will decide if it should also become a 
member of WEU or merely have observer 
status. I feel that the latter option is the 
more likely. " 
98. Meanwhile, Sweden has adopted a positive 
attitude about participating in the partnership for 
peace programme 22 and, unlike Finland, did not 
join the NACC which is considered to be devoted 
first and foremost to the former Warsaw Pact 
countries. Nevertheless Sweden continues to give 
high priorities to participation in various forms of 
peace-keeping operations in which the Nordic 
countries co-operate effectively. Two joint Nordic 
22. See contribution of the Swedish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in NATO Review, April1994. 
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battalions under United Nations command have 
been deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) and in Bosnia. During its 
stay in Helsinki, the committee was informed that 
as the Norwegian and Swedish contingents were 
to leave the FYROM, the Finnish units were 
asked to fill the gap. 
99. The three countries are faced with a funda-
mental political new choice and orientation which 
will not be easy to put over to public opinion, 
which has to be convinced that this choice will be 
to the advantage of the countries concerned and of 
Europe as a whole. For various reasons which dif-
fer from country to country it is understandable 
that these countries should be granted time to 
consider what kind of relationship they wish to 
establish with WEU. 
100. But it is obvious that, in order to achieve 
the objective of Article J.4 of the Maastricht 
Treaty at a later stage, the broadest possible 
identity between member states of the Union and 
of WEU should be the political goal. More aston-
ishing is the position adopted on 24th March 1994 
by the European Parliament in a resolution " on 
development of a common security and defence 
policy for the European Union " when it empha-
sises " that relations with countries with which 
accession negotiations are under way should be 
conducted in such a way as to make these coun-
tries fully aware that membership of WEU as a 
military alliance is not an essential condition for 
accession to the European Union". How does 
this fit in when the same resolution in another 
paragraph " advocates that all member states of 
the European Union should become full members 
ofWEU?" 
101. Norway's position regarding joining the 
European Union is slightly different since it is one 
of the founder members of NATO and already has 
observer status in WEU. Nevertheless the public 
opinion that supports the Union still seems to be 
in a minority. The Nielsen Norway Institute made 
public at the beginning of March the result of a 
poll which showed 28% in favour, 42% against 
and 30% undecided. According the results of an 
opinion poll published by Dagbladet on 
18th April 1994, 50% of the Norwegians remain 
opposed to their country's accession to the Euro-
pean Union, 36% are in favour and 14% are still 
undecided. Opinion polls in March were 52% 
against and 34% in favour. According to other 
surveys the number of those who have not yet 
made up their minds is even higher. 
102. During an information visit to Oslo on 
21st and 22nd Apri11994, your Rapporteur was 
told that parliament had not yet definitely decided 
on the date of the referendum, but that it would be 
held late in November, probably on 28th Novem-
ber 1994, in order to give voters enough time to 
form their opinion. Furthermore, while most 
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governmental and parliamentary authorities are 
fairly optimistic that the result of the referendum 
will be positive, they feel it would be advantage-
ous to give the voters an opportunity to hear the 
results of referendums in the other three EFfA 
countries. 
103. Everyone your Rapporteur had the oppor-
tunity to meet underlined that the security and 
defence aspect was the government's most impor-
tant reason for applying for membership of the 
European Union. The State Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs said clearly that, once a full member of the 
European Union, Norway would also seek full 
membership ofWEU. Official circles are satisfied 
with the outcome of the negotiations, including 
the fishing and agricultural sectors, but there is 
still considerable public opposition to the treaties. 
Governmental authorities therefore believe that 
the security aspects will be crucial for a positive 
vote. 
104. Norway has a 200 km land border with 
Russia. It is fully integrated in the military com-
mand structure of NATO, but does not accept the 
permanent stationing of foreign troops on its terri-
tory nor the deployment of nuclear weapons. In a 
speech at the Leang Kollen Seminar on 
7th February 1994, the Norwegian Foreign Minis-
ter recalled that the only remaining Russian 
nuclear test site is located at Novaya Zemlya, 
close to Norwegian territory. Norwegians are 
concerned about the risk accidents or leakage 
from nuclear tests. The minister said inter alia: 
"Although Norway remains the only 
NATO country with a common border with 
Russia, we do not today view Russia as 
posing a concrete threat. We do however 
realise that there is widespread discontent 
and uncertainty. Barents co-operation and 
Baltic Sea co-operation are new approaches 
for solving old problems. The Baltic Sea 
and the Barents regions are the only two 
regions in which, in a foreseeable future, 
Russia will share a common border with 
countries of the European economic area, 
hopefully soon also member states of the 
European Union." 
105. . . . " The problems related to the military 
complex on the Kola Peninsula and the 
Kola nuclear power plant, which is 200 km 
from the Norwegian-Russian border, are of 
particular concern. " 
One parliamentarian said that the largest concen-
tration in the world is located in the Murmansk 
area. It is therefore understandable that Norway 
wishes to bring its so far bilateral cross border 
dialogue with Russia into the broader context of 
the European Union. Like the Swedish authori-
ties, the Norwegian representatives in the Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs stressed the importance of 
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not excluding the Baltic states from the enhanced 
status to be granted by WEU to the Central Euro-
pean countries. But the Norwegian authorities 
also made clear that they did not want to see coun-
tries becoming full members of WEU which were 
not closely linked with NATO. 
106. In the abovementioned address, the Norwe-
gian Foreign Minister evaluated NATO's partner-
ship for peace initiative in a specific and positive 
manner. In his view it provides a dynamic pers-
pective that has been largely underestimated in 
the public debate, whereas its political element, 
the granting of consultation rights, has potential 
as a significant contribution to European crisis-
management and crisis-prevention. Norway 
which, like the other Nordic countries, has a signi-
ficant experience in peace-keeping, intends to 
contribute actively in order to make the initiative 
a success. It wants Finland and Sweden to partici-
pate, in particular with regard to peace-keeping: 
"The successful Nordic co-operation in 
this field already established within the 
framework of the United Nations could be 
further developed in a broader European 
context." 
Norway is also prepared to provide concrete assis-
tance to partnership for peace countries in order to 
enable them to seize in full the opportunities now 
open to them. In particular, the Norwegian 
Government will consider co-operation with the 
Baltic states as an important contribution in this 
respect. 
107. Summarising the various information and 
impressions gathered in all four EFfA countries, 
one can come to the conclusion that their acces-
sion to the Union will strengthen its cohesion and 
homogeneity and contribute also to stability in 
Europe as a whole. Notwithstanding the decisions 
still to be reached by these countries regarding 
their future relationship with Western European 
Union, the Council should increase appropriate 
contacts with them in order to keep them fully 
informed about WED's role and activities and 
also to indicate how much contributions from 
these countries in the specific areas of their capa-
cities and experience - for instance in peace-
keeping - and as important factors of stability in 
their respective regions will be appreciated. 
(ii) The Central European countries 
108. On 9th May 1994, the Council of WEU is 
to take a decision on the scope of the " associate " 
status it intends to grant to the countries par-
ticipating in the WEU Forum of Consultation. In 
this context, your Rapporteur wishes to recall the 
importance of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Recommen-
dation 556 on the evolution of NATO and its 
consequences for WEU adopted by the Standing 
Committee on 3rd May 1994 on the basis of the 
report submitted by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the 
Political Committee, and also paragraphs 19 to 24 
of the explanatory memorandum of that report. 
109. After the Political Committee's visits in 
1993 to six of the nine countries in question, your 
Rapporteur deemed it necessary to complete the 
information by visiting the three Baltic countries 
which call for special attention bearing in mind 
their close links with the Nordic countries such as 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland. These countries, 
which had lost their independence as victims of 
the Stalin-Ribbentrop Pact which was confirmed 
at the Yalta Conference, succeeded only in 1991 
in regaining their independence, but in Latvia and 
Estonia a number of Russian troops still remain. 
110. The Rapporteur's visit to the Baltic states, 
which was particularly rich in information, confrr-
med his convinction that the Council ofWEU took 
the right decision by including these countries in 
the Forum of Consultation and granting them an 
associate status in WEU. Like the Nordic countries 
and the other Central European countries, they 
belong to the European family which sooner or 
later should be united in the European Union. 
111. Important steps have been taken by all the 
Baltic states to pave the way for drawing closer to 
the West and for settling their relationship with 
their neighbours, and in particular with Russia. 
All three countries participate in NATO's partner-
ship for peace initiative and have created a joiJ?t 
peace-keeping battalion. The creation of a Baltic 
Council, composed of the Heads of State, a Coun-
cil of Ministers and a Baltic parliamentary 
Assembly with strong links to the Nordic Council 
offers a valuable means of strengthening intra-
Baltic co-operation, solidarity and stability. 
112. All the countries need substantial support 
and help in order to establish. the necessary a~­
istrative infrastructure for therr new democratic ms-
titutions including training, mareriel and equipment 
for their police forces and for protecting and 
controlling their borders. In this respect they 
already receive considerable assistance from the 
Nordic countries, especially Denmark, Sweden, and 
Finland but also, in the economic field, Germany. 
113. This generally positive development howe-
ver cannot hide the fact that a number of important 
problems remain to be solved. Whereas Lithuania 
no longer has Russian troops on its soil, the large 
Russian military presence in the district of Kalinin-
grad is a source of concern. In his annual ad~ess to 
Parliament on lOth February 1994, the President of 
the Republic of Lithuania stressed that: 
" Lithuania is raising the issue of demilita-
rising the Kaliningrad district in internatio-
nal forqms, because that is a problem that is 
shared not only by Lithuania, but by all of 
the states in the Baltic Sea region. The eco-
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nomic, environmental and cultural interests 
of the Kaliningrad region often overlap 
with those of Lithuania and in that sense 
they become common. In our opinion, it 
would be useful for Russia, and the states 
that neighbour the Kaliningrad district to 
establish a special trade zone in this region. 
International organisations, especially the 
European Union could play an increasingly 
more important role in it. Statements by 
Russian politicians and military officials to 
significantly reduce the military potential 
in this district and to react more flexibly to 
suggestions for changing its economic sta-
tus should be evaluated positively. " 
114. Lithuanian authorities have therefore indi-
cated in their talks with the Rapporteur that this 
question should be included in the conferenc~ on 
a stability pact initiated by the French Pnme 
Minister, Mr. Balladur. After some difficulties, 
Lithuania and Poland have now normalised their 
relationship on the basis of a bilateral treaty sett-
ling inter alia the question of minorities 23• 
115. Latvia has now signed an agreement with 
Russia according to which all remaining 12 000 
Russian troops will leave the country by 
31st August 1994 24• The package of agreements 
also settles the right for retired Russian officers 
(about 20-25 000) to remain in the country and to 
benefit from social assistance but they will not be 
allowed to take Latvian citizenship. Furthermore, 
the Russian side was granted the right to use their 
radar early warning system in Skrunda for a fur-
ther four years with the proviso that the installa-
tions will be dismantled within 18 months at the 
end of this period. 
116. Finalising this agreement was particularly 
difficult in the light of a decree published on 
5th April1994 by the Russian President, Mr. Yelt-
sin, to establish Russian military bases in the ter-
ritories of the Community of Independent States 
(CIS) and the Republic of Latvia. The mentioning 
of Latvia in that decree was later described by the 
Russian side as an " error " 
117. Similar negotiations between Estonia and 
Russia have not yet reached final results. The 
Russians link the signing of an agreement on 
withdrawing the remaining 2 500-odd Russian 
troops from Estonia with other questions such as 
the rights of retired military personnel and pay-
ment for building housing in Russia. Whereas 
Estonia is ready to participate in international 
efforts regarding accommodation facilities for 
Russian military personnel withdrawn to Russia, 
it is not prepared to link these questions with the 
Russian commitment to withdraw their troops. 
Furthermore, a special problem stems from a for-
23. NZZ, 28th April1994. 
24. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2nd May 1994. 
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mer Soviet nuclear submarine training and study 
base in Paldiski on the Baltic sea coast southwest 
of Tallinn which is still under Russian control. 
Nevertheless there is agreement that the site has to 
be dismantled under Russian responsibility. Cer-
tain Estonian authorities fear that while the Rus-
sians succeeded in concluding separate negotia-
tions on similar problems with Latvia, they are 
trying to breach Baltic solidarity. 
118. Last but not least, one should mention that 
both Latvia and Estonia have open border 
problems with Russia due to the fact that in 1945 
the borders fixed by the peace treaties of 1920 
were changed slightly in favour of the Soviet 
Union; when these countries at the same time 
became part of the Soviet Union, the relevant bor-
ders became merely administrative lines. 
119. It has already been stressed as one of the 
essential conditions to be fulfilled by countries 
wishing to join the European Union and Western 
European Union that they should first have settled 
any bilateral disputes between each other and with 
third countries. This applies also to the other Cen-
tral European countries. In this respect the impor-
tance of the initiative by Mr. Balladur, French 
Prime Minister, for an international conference on 
a European stability pact should be underlined. 
120. The conference will be opened by the Euro-
pean Union in Paris on 26th and 27th May 1994 in 
a context of preventive diplomacy with the main 
objective of settling problems of minorities and 
strengthening the inviolability of frontiers. It is 
intended to help in particular those countries 
wishing to draw closer to the European Union, but 
not to handle the problems of countries which are 
engaged in open conflicts. Apart from the twelve 
member countries of the Union, all countries 
interested in European stability and those with 
association agreements with the Union will be 
invited, such as Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bulga-
ria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Malta, Mol-
dova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, the Vati-
can, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Ukraine and the United States as well as 
representatives of the CSCE, the Council of 
Europe, WEU, NATO and the United Nations. It 
is to be hoped that it will be possible for the 
conference to help to settle most of the problems 
mentioned in previous paragraphs regarding the 
Central European countries and the Baltic states. 
121. Regarding the future work of WEU, it is 
obvious that however the relations of the EFTA 
countries with WEU develop after their entry into 
the Union, and how exactly the WEU Council 
will defme a new status to be granted to the Cen-
tral European countries, WEU will soon be faced 
with the problem of organising a new quality of 
relations with at least thirteen newcomers. 
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122. There might soon be some fifteen countries 
participating in the work of Western European 
Union as associate members, as members with 
associate status or as observers, without acceding 
to the modified Brussels Treaty. This will create 
important organisational and political problems 
because it will not be possible to base a common 
defence policy or common defence on a group of 
states only a minority of which is linked by a for-
mal treaty. Furthermore, enlargement of the 
Union and of Western European Union to the 
north and east will considerably change the strate-
gic significance of the European security architec-
ture. With Norway, Finland (and perhaps Estonia 
and Latvia), the European Union will have a com-
mon frontier with Russia some 2 000 km long. 
123. In the context of enlarging the Union and 
establishing WED's enhanced relationship with 
the Northern and Central European countries, 
your Rapporteur would draw attention to the fact 
that Western European Union does not discuss in 
sufficient detail the problem of Moldova, a region 
which is the victim of the Ribbentrop-Stalin 
arrangements similar to the Baltic states. 
IV. WEU in the perspective of 1996 
124. With the entry of the EFTA countries into 
the Union and the future enlargement of the Union 
to include a number of Central European coun-
tries, the goals laid down in Title V of the Maas-
tricht Treaty regarding the implementation of a 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) 
" which might in time lead to a common defence " 
will certainly not become easier. The new struc-
tures to be established under the CFSP with the 
secretariat of the Council, the conference of the 
permanent representatives and the Political Com-
mittee of Political Directors are rather complica-
ted. The CFSP will not be more homogenous than 
it is at present. Probably there will be even less 
identity of membership in the CFSP and in WEU 
than is the case at present. In 1996 it will therefore 
be more difficult than now to establish common 
defence within the European Union by incorpora-
ting WED. 
125. It will therefore be crucial for the Council 
of WEU to begin here and now its thinking in 
regard to its conception of the intergovernmental 
conference in 1996. The more the Union is enlar-
ged to include countries which are not prepared to 
subscribe to obligations in defence matters and to 
become full members of Western European 
Union, the less it will be possible to subordinate 
WEU to the authority of the Union. WEU must 
therefore elaborate proposals for the new intergo-
vernmental conference with a view to ensuring 
that it is granted a general mandate and authority 
to elaborate and implement, for the Union, all 
questions with defence implications. Further-
more, WEU will have to reconsider its doctrine 
determining the degree to which it can develop its 
relationship with European member countries of 
NATO which are not members of the European 
Union such as Turkey and Iceland. Shall member-
ship of the European Union remain the principal 
condition for becoming a full member of Western 
European Union? 
126. Since WEU as a whole is now an integral 
part of the development of the European Union, it is 
for the Council and the Assembly to take an active 
part in preparing an eventual revision of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, reminding the Council that WEU 
declared in an appendix to the Maastricht Treaty: 
" WEU will re-examine the present provisions in 
1996. This re-examination will take account of the 
progress and experience acquired and will extend to 
relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance ". 
It should be noted that the part of the sentence in 
italics is missing from the corresponding 
paragraph 6 of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty. 
V. Conclusion 
127. 23rd October 1994 will be the fortieth anni-
versary of the modified Brussels Treaty. Ten years 
ago, the thirtieth anniversary was taken as an 
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occasion for an extraordinary meeting of the 
WEU Ministers in Rome, leading to the Rome 
declaration initiating the reactivation of the 
organisation. The extraordinary challenge 
Western European Union is now facing is to 
prove its efficiency as the defence component of 
the European Union, and in assuming enhanced 
responsibilities, endorsed by the NATO summit 
meeting in January 1994. There is now even 
greater reason to hold an extraordinary meeting 
than ten years ago. 
128. With the approaching" deadline" of 1998, 
it would be crucial to take this year's anniversary 
as an opportunity to recall the importance of the 
treaty, as was done in Rome, and to start reflecting 
on how it can continue to serve in the framework 
of the Union. In issuing a public document similar 
to the Rome declaration of October 1984, WEU 
could start a move to give basic orientation for the 
work to be done in order to ensure that the objec-
tive of furthering European integration in security 
and defence matters will not be seen only as an 
end in itself but will lead to a real improvement in 
the security of the citizens of Europe. For this pur-
pose, it is crucial for the fundamental aspects of 
the modified Brussels Treaty, which are the only 
guarantees for this security, not to be diluted . 
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Declaration on the WEU Assembly's place 
in the European Union 
Paris, 2nd March 1993 
The Presidential Committee, the steering 
body of the WEU Assembly, met in Brussels yes-
terday. It adopted the enclosed declaration on the 
WEU Assembly's place in the European Union and 
instructed Mr. Hartmut Soell (SPD, Germany), Pre-
sident of the Assembly, to transmit it to Mr. Egon 
Klepsch, President of the European Parliament. 
At its meeting, the Presidential Committee 
met the new Permanent Council of WEU for the 
first time. Exchanges of views related mainly to the 
Yugoslav crisis, WED's operational dimension, the 
consequences of the enlargement of WEU for its 
Assembly and improving the institutional dialogue 
between the Assembly and the Council. 
1. Building the European Union is a task 
which calls for co-operation between all appro-
priate bodies and every step must be subject to 
effective parliamentary supervision. The co-ope-
ration of the European Parliament and of the 
WEU Assembly provided for in the Maastricht 
Agreements is necessary to this end. 
2. The Assembly of Western European Union 
therefore welcomes the fact that, in accordance 
with the wishes expressed by the governments in 
Maastricht, exchanges of views are now being 
held between its committees and those of the 
European Parliament. It believes that such 
exchanges can be fruitful when reports are being 
prepared, provided those taking part are willing to 
take account of the points of view expressed by 
their partners. 
3. The meeting on 29th January at which the 
Political Committee of the WEU Assembly was 
briefed by Mr. De Gucht, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Institutional Affairs of the European 
Parliament on future relations between the Euro-
pean Community, WEU and the Atlantic Alli-
ance, was particularly lively and led the Presiden-
tial Committee of the WEU Assembly to give its 
views on certain points. 
4. Noting that the Maastricht Treaty states 
that " the common foreign and security policy 
shall include all questions related to the security 
of the Union, including the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy, which might in time lead 
to a common defence ", the WEU Assembly notes 
that the signatory states of the Maastricht Treaty 
took no decision limiting their sovereignty in this 
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area and that several states that are members of the 
Union or have applied for membership have shown 
that they are not prepared to accept such provisions 
in the near future. It recalls that the Maastricht 
Treaty provides for these aims to be pursued only 
through " systematic co-operation between mem-
ber states in the conduct of policy " and by the 
implementation of "joint action in the areas in 
which the member states have important interests 
in common. " It believes that only a completed 
European Union might develop joint defence. 
5. As long as this is not the case, the modified 
Brussels Treaty remains the essential legal foun-
dation for a European identity in defence matters 
and the structures WEU is progressively setting 
up are the instruments for European military 
action. It would therefore be dangerous to 
denounce this treaty and to abandon these instru-
ments as long as no agreement has been reached 
to give defence Europe other legal bases, other 
institutions and other means of action. 
6. At the present juncture, because the WEU 
Assembly is composed of delegations from the par-
liaments of member countries, it is better able than 
the European Parliament to supervise co-operation 
between member countries on security and defence 
matters. The WEU Assembly in no way challenges 
the right of the European Parliament to consider 
receiving, in the framework of a future European 
Union, responsibilities that allow it to handle exter-
nal policy including questions relating to common 
security and it wishes to develop a dialogue with it 
on these questions, in appropriate conditions, based 
on the principle of equality and reciprocity. How-
ever, it considers that such a dialogue requires the 
European Parliament to co-operate with the WEU 
Assembly in pursuing the aim set by the modified 
Brussels Treaty which is " to promote the unity and 
to encourage the progressive integration of 
Europe ", as laid down in the preamble, and to 
recognise that the task of the WEU Assembly is to 
supervise the application of this treaty. 
7. The WEU Assembly for its part considers 
itself to be committed to the process of European 
Union defined by the nine member states in the 
Maastricht declaration which confirms its voca-
tion to be the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. It considers that, when the time comes, 
it will, as a European Assembly in which the par-
liaments of member states are represented, have 
an important role to play in the European parlia-
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mentary system, in particular with a view to har-
monising European activities and those of the 
member states of the Union in defence matters. As 
long as every aspect of the European Union is not 
in place, a European defence policy which would 
not be supervised in accordance with a treaty by 
an assembly composed of representatives of 




8. The WEU Assembly invites the European 
Parliament to take account of these facts in its 
thinking on the institutional future of the Euro-
pean Union and in particular on relations bet-
ween the Community, WEU and the Atlantic 
Alliance so that Europe will be better able to 
take over the growing responsibilities incum-
bent upon it in the areas of foreign policy and 
defence. 
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